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The Return on Social Bonds:
Social Hierarchy and International Conflict
Mark David Nieman∗
Abstract
This paper takes game-theoretic and latent variable approaches to modeling in-
ternational social hierarchies and their effect on conflict among states. I argue that,
within these hierarchies, states adopts one of two roles—a dominant or a subordinate.
Each resulting (dyadic) dominant–subordinate relationship is a social (informal) con-
tract, in which the subordinate concedes some autonomy in exchange for dominant’s
protection. This social hierarchy affects the relationships between each subordinate
and dominant, as well as the relationships among subordinates. A state’s degree of
subordination reduces its probability of conflict initiation. The decision to initiate
conflict is also affected by the target’s relative level of subordination vis-a`-vis the chal-
lenger. These predictions are supported by empirical analyses of states within the US
hierarchy (1950–2000).
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Introduction
International states are social actors and, as such, are nested within dense informal networks
of friendly and conflictual relationships. Rather than lateral relationships among equals,
networks among states tend to have a vertical or hierarchical structure. During different
time periods, states have chosen to look for policy cues and leadership to one or few policy
leaders or innovators (e.g., the UK in the 18th and 19th centuries, the US or the Soviet
Union/Russia in the 20th century). Importantly, international hierarchical relationships may
arise as a result of both material power asymmetries as well as non-material asymmetries
that stem from political legitimacy or policy innovation. The latter type of hierarchies—
social hierarchies have received little scholarly attention (Lake 2009). While most scholars
(implicitly) acknowledge the existence of such social hierarchies among international states,
few studies have modeled such hierarchies and their effects on international outcomes.1
The most obvious reason for this lack of attention is that the study of social authority or
legitimacy is often impeded by the informal or intangible nature of these concepts. Measuring
a state’s intangible power to persuade is not as simple as counting up its number of tanks
or warships. Unlike material power, a state’s level of authority can only be measured in a
relational way. When the US, for example, increases its number of tanks, it is increasing its
material power vis-a`-vis every other state. Most would agree, however, that when it comes
to authority, an increase in US legitimacy vis-a`-vis Egypt is not necessarily associated with
a change in legitimacy in the US–Argentina relationship. Each state, in other words, grants
and is granted varying degrees of authority by every other state.
To alleviate some of these theoretical issues, I model the effects of social hierarchy using a
game-theoretic approach. I start by assuming that international social hierarchies are made
up of states that adopt one of two roles: a dominant, who acts as the creator and enforcer
1Despite over-lapping terminology, it is important to distinguish between the study of social hierarchy—
the goal of the current manuscript—and the rich literature on material hierarchies/hegemonies (Ikenberry
2000; Modelski 1987; Organski 1958). In contrast to the hierarchy/hegemonic literature, the current study
focuses on social, rather than material, hierarchy. Moreover, rather than explaining conflict or other out-
comes at the systemic level—the traditional focus of the hierarchy/hegemonic literature—I derive predictions
regarding the hierarchy’s effect on minor powers’ interaction—a topic of little interest to the traditional hege-
monic literature.
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of social contracts, and a subordinate, who decides to what degree, if any, to accept the
dominant’s authority. Dominant states are defined as states that serve (and are viewed by
subordinates) as legitimate authorities on policy-innovation; they are “trusted” as having
expertise in some or most policy areas (Fordham and Asal 2007; Thies 2013). Legitimate
authority, or “rightful rule,” is particularly important for separating states that take on
the role of the dominants within a social hierarchy from a hegemon whose dominance is
based solely on material power (Lake 2009, 8).2 In fact, as I show later, the degree of
social hierarchy between two states is uncorrelated with differences in their material power
capabilities.
A state’s degree of subordination within a dominant’s hierarchy refers to this state’s level
of (informal) policy dependence on the dominant. Belarus, for example, has a high degree
of subordination to Russia: Minsk looks to Moscow for policy guidance and approval, and
is unlikely to implement policies that contradict Moscow’s interests. Contrast this with
Japan, which has a low degree of subordination to Russia: Russia’s policy interests do not
enter into Japan’s policy decisions. A state’s relative level of subordination, on the other
hand, is defined as its hierarchical position vis-a`-vis another subordinate state. Continuing
with the example of Russia’s social hierarchy, prior to the 2013–2014 EuroMaidan protests,
Ukraine might have been characterized as moderately subordinate to Moscow, perhaps less
subordinate than Belarus, yet more subordinate than Japan.
Importantly, in addition to explaining the dominant—subordinate interactions, this the-
oretical framework helps explain interactions among subordinate states. Belonging to the
same hierarchy, for example, may alleviate a rivalry between subordinate states, as long as
each subordinate values its relationship with the dominant more than it distrusts a rival. The
quasi-alliance between Japan and South Korea (via the US), for example, is often used to
explain why their oft-contentious relationship has seldom boiled over into militarized conflict
(Cha 1997). Sharing dense ties to the US is also a contributing factor in creating a peace-
ful culture of dispute resolution among Latin American states, despite numerous competing
2While often conflated, material superiority and legitimacy are distinct concepts (Lake 2009, 21-23). For
example, despite military superiority, a foreign occupier is not always viewed as legitimate.
3
territorial claims and rivalries (Thies 2008).
The theoretical model also sheds light on the debate within the alliance literature on
whether close ties between states (e.g., alliances) have a constraining or emboldening effect
(Leeds 2003; Machain and Morgan 2013; Smith 1995). States with higher levels of subordina-
tion, relative to their rivals may, for example, expect the dominant to “look the other way,”
should they decide to settle scores. Yet, on balance, the model shows that subordination has
a constraining effect on conflict initiation, as long as the (potential) challenger has at least
a small degree of uncertainty regarding the dominant’s likely response.
I test the theory by empirically modelling the relationships between the US and its
subordinates using a strategic probit—a type of random utility model. The estimator isolates
the deterring effects, such as the military balance of power, from factors that make states less
inclined to challenge the status quo in the first place, such as social hierarchy. Interestingly,
by separating preferences for the status quo from deterrence, the model allows for conducting
one of the few direct tests of general deterrence.
Social Hierarchy
International social hierarchy is made up of bilateral social contracts, in which subordinate
states concede varying levels of policy autonomy, in return for ideological and material ben-
efits provided by the dominant state (Lake 2009; Thies 2013; Wendt and Friedheim 1995).
Expressions of social hierarchy permeate every aspect of international relations. They mani-
fest themselves, for example, in symbolic alliance networks among the dominant’s allies (e.g.
alliance among Costa Rica, Haiti, and Uruguay): while, on its own, each of these bilateral al-
liances may contribute little to their members’ defense, taken together, dense embeddedness
within the US alliance network signals (to the US and others) rather tangible policy depen-
dence on the US, as such alliances are often associated with reductions in defense spending
among smaller states (Machain and Morgan 2013; Lake 2009). Although not using the so-
cial hierarchy terminology, Morrow (1991) makes a similar argument regarding asymmetric
alliances, which he views as arrangements, in which the weaker state effectively trades some
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policy flexibility for security guarantees by the stronger state.
Hierarchy manifestations are, of course, not limited to alliance relationships. Hierarchi-
cal relationships are reflected in membership patterns within international organizations,
adherence to certain economic policies, or high embeddedness within the dominant’s trade
network. The strength of British social hierarchy between 1815–1914, for example, can
be gleaned from the density of trade connections/exchanges among the states, adhering to
British leadership (Pahre 2008).
Although not problematized here, the subordinate’s choice to follow the policy lead (join
the hierarchy) of a particular dominant is often explained as resulting from social interactions
among political and economic elites. Cox and Sinclair (1996, 518) note, for example, that
social hierarchy “derives from the ways of doing and thinking of the dominant social strata
of the dominant state or states insofar as these ways of doing and thinking have inspired em-
ulation or acquired the acquiescence of the dominant social strata of other states” (emphasis
added). Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990, 283) agree, arguing that “[e]lites in secondary states
buy into and internalize norms that are articulated by the hegemon and therefore pursue poli-
cies consistent with the hegemon’s notion of international order” (emphasis added). Thus,
the number of Western-educated elites within a state increase the likelihood of democrati-
zation (Gift and Krcmaric 2015) and economic liberalization (Weymouth and MacPherson
2012).
Acceptance of a social contract limits expressions of power and reduces the range of
possible actions for both parties. While material factors put physical restraints on a state’s
reach (e.g., loss of strength gradient), social hierarchy acts as a social constraint on both
dominant and subordinate states. The trade-off between autonomy and security within
the alliance arrangements, for example, is known to produce more reliable alliances than
those that merely aggregate capabilities or “marriages-of-convenience,” because the former
are based on shared preferences rather than short-term material considerations (Gibler and
Rider 2004; Morrow 1991).
The central argument here is that identifying and modeling social hierarchies helps gain
leverage on explaining (foreign and domestic) policy choices of international states, in a
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similar way that studying social cliques helps understand actions of their individual members.
In particular, knowing a state’s relative position within a hierarchy provides information on
its relationships with other states that occupy higher or lower position within this hierarchy.
Much like members of social cliques adopt particular habits and style, states internalize
or beauracratize the policies dictated by their hierarchical position (Wendt and Friedheim
1995).
Subordinates are more likely to pursue “appropriate” policies (from the dominant’s per-
spective) if they are more committed to the dominant’s ideological/normative policies (Lake
2009; Thies 2013). Yet, even states with a high degree of subordination to a dominant may
still hold some roles, and even act on roles, that are inconsistent with the dominant’s pref-
erences. State A may, for instance, value its role as a rival of State B more than its role as
the dominant’s ally, even if State A is highly subordinate to the dominant. In this scenario,
State A would adhere to the dominants preferences as they relate to all states, except its
rival (State B). For example, despite otherwise implementing policies consistent with US
preferences throughout 1960-1970s (secular government, host US military bases, economic
liberalization), Turkey continued to engage in militarized disputes with Greece.
The pursuit of foreign policies that are incongruent with the dominant’s interests are
defined as (foreign) policy challenges. In the security domain, a challenge may involve,
for example, (unsanctioned) conflict initiation against a third-party (e.g., settling rivalries,
despite the dominant’s disapproval). The dominant state may respond to a challenge with
a punishment, such as military or economic sanctions (Lake 2009; Stone 2004).3
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, for example, Yugoslavia was highly sub-
ordinate to the USSR, accepting the USSR as the leader of global communism. This had
changed, however, in 1948, when Yugoslavia rejected Soviet input regarding its domestic
economic plan. Yugoslavia continued to challenge Soviet authority by failing to before inter-
vening in the Greek civil war or signing a treaty with Bulgaria (Priestland 2009, 218-219).
3Punishments can only occur in response to a challenge and aim to re-enforce the hierarchical relationship.
In contrast, predatory actions, are coercive actions by the dominant for imperial or other reasons, do not
occur in response to a challenge and generally serve to undermine the authority which social hierarchy is
built on.
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Table 1: Punishments and US Security Hierarchy, 1950–2000
Relative Target–Challenger Subordination
Challenger ≤ Target Challenger > Target Total
Punishment 303 (42.4%) 79 (12.9%) 382 (28.8%)
No Punishment 411 533 944
Total 714 612 1326
Degree of subordination within US security hierarchy. Variable measure-
ments discussed in Research Design.
The USSR responded to these challenges by expelling Yugoslavia from the Communist In-
formation Bureau and terminating their bilateral alliance (Leeds et al. 2002). By 1955,
however, Yugoslavia moved back up in the Soviet hierarchy, with the two states reconciling
and exchanging ambassadors (Priestland, 2009, 332-333; Valdez, 1993, 40).
A state’s degree of subordination, in absolute and relative terms (in relation to the tar-
get/challenger) may affect its likelihood challenging and being punished. Table 1 shows the
frequencies of challenges and punishments among the subordinates within the US hierarchy.
We can see, in particular, that challenges by states with higher subordination (in relation
to targets) are less frequent that vice versa (46% vs 54%), despite a substantially lower fre-
quency of punishments against such challenges (13% vs 42%). While the results depicted in
Table 1 do not account for strategic behavior, they provide some preliminary evidence that
state behavior may be affected by their positions within social hierarchies.
A Model of Social Hierarchy and Conflict
I model the above argument as a two-player, non-cooperative game with private informa-
tion and solve it using the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) concept (McKelvey and
Palfrey 1998; Signorino 1999). The formal model helps flesh out the potential alliance–
“emboldedness” dynamic induced by social hierarchy while also acknowledging the endoge-
nous relationship between the degree of subordination and the relative degree of subordina-
tion: an increase in a state’s degree of subordination both raises its own utility for the status
quo, yet also reduces its likelihood of being punished by the dominant (since its relative
7





BT − cB + piSCon ,
HT −HS − cD − A+ piDCon
¬Pun
BT + piSAcq ,
piDAcq
D
degree of subordination also increases). The model extends previous work (e.g., Bueno de
Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Powell 1999) by shifting the focus from material to ideational
power relationships among states.
Consider a game between a dominant state, D, and a subordinate state, S. Both actors
are rational and pursue actions that maximize their expected utility. In addition, two other
actors influence the payoffs of S and D: the target of the subordinate state’s challenge, T ,
and the presence of an alternative dominant, A. I normalize parameter values between 0
and 1, unless otherwise denoted. The extensive form game is depicted in Figure 1.
In the first stage, S chooses whether to challenge the status quo. If S does not challenge,
the game ends with the status quo outcome, SQ. If S challenges, the game moves to the
second stage where D decides whether to punish. If D does not punish, the game results
in acquiescence by the dominant state, Acq. If D punishes, then the game ends with the
conflict outcome, Con.
In addition to utilities, each payoff includes private information known only to player i.
Private information captures uncertainty regarding the other state’s true intentions and may
represent a state’s efficiency or resolve in coping with (levying) punishments (Signorino 1999).
Private information is denoted as piij , where i represents the player and j an outcome. Neither
¬i nor the analyst knows the value of piij ; they do, however, know its mean and distribution.
piij are assumed to be independently and identically normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance σ2. When σ2 is small, ¬i and the analyst have a better idea of i’s utility from each
outcome.
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The payoff for SQ reflects reflects S’s degree of subordination within D’s hierarchy, HS,
and private information piSSQ . As HS increases, S places greater importance on adhering to
the policies of D.4 A state with high HS, such as Great Britain, for example, is unlikely to
act against US interests in the Middle East by selling Iran centrifuges. S’s status quo utility
can be written as U∗S (SQ) = HS + piSSQ .
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S’s payoffs for both Acq and Con include its expected benefits, BT , from challenging
by initiating conflict against T . Since the goal of the model is to isolate the dominant–
subordinate interactions, rather than explicitly modeling S’s interaction with T , I assume
that S has calculated its expected utility from fighting T (for similar modeling assumptions,
see Powell 1999, Appendix 5). A state that has territorial claims with a neighbor, such as
Nicaragua’s claims against Columbia in the San Andres Archipelago, has an expectation of
the benefits/costs of resolving the claim.
The Con payoff also includes a cost parameter, cS, which captures the costs that S
pays as a result of being punished (0 < cS ≤ 1). This parameter ensures that S prefers
Acq to Con and reflects that punishments involve some cost. Returning to the Nicaragua–
Columbia example, should Nicaragua decide to invade San Andreas, it would prefer that
the US not respond with sanctions. The payoffs also include the private information terms
piSAcq and piSCon . More formally, the utilities for the outcomes are U
∗
S (Acq) = BT +piSAcq and
U∗S (Con) = BT−cS + piSCon .
D’s payoff for Con includes the relative subordination between T and S, or HT −HS.6 As
HT − HS increases in value, so does D’s expected utility from punishment (Con). In other
words, D derives greater benefit from punishing challenges, directed against targets with
higher subordination (compared to the challenger): e.g., when Japan or South Korea receive
threats from North Korea.7 A cost parameter, cD, is included to modelD’s costs of punishing
(0 < cD ≤ 1). To account for the presence of alternative dominants, D’s payoff from Con
4The term HS is an ideational analogue of Powell’s (1999) “distribution of benefits.”
5D’s SQ payoff does not impact any decisions in the game and is not displayed in Figure 1.
6This is analogous to Kydd (2006) and Savun (2008), who argue that mediator’s relative bias for/against
claimant A compared to B, rather than their bias for/against A, affects mediation outcomes.
7Note that, even though HT − HS can take on negative values, this does not mean that D prefers
“challenge” to “not challenge”; this merely reflects that D views some targets as more valuable than others.
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also includes S’s degree of subordination to an alternative dominant, A. A represents the
expected costs of intervention by an alternative dominant, should D choose Pun; hence,
A serves as a deterrent on the dominant from punishing (the alternative dominant may
intervene to fulfill its own obligation to defend its subordinates). I also include the private
information term, piDCon . Finally, D’s payoff for Acq includes only its private information,
piDAcq . Formally, U
∗
D (Con) = HT − HS − cD − A+ piDCon and U∗D (Acq) = piDAcq .
Equilibria
The best response of a player is conditioned by the observable portion of the games (HS, HT ,
BT , cS, cD, A), the known distributions of the unobservable terms (piSSQ , piSAcq , piSCon , piDAcq ,
piDCon), and the history of the game. Players make their decisions based on random utility
assumptions, selecting the best choice available to them based on the equilibria distribution
of their opponent’s choices (McKelvey and Palfrey 1998, 9-10). More intuitively, players
make strategic choices based on the expected action of the other player, and the game’s
equilibria are probabilistic.8
The game is solved backwards, by first solving for D’s equilibria choice and then using



















where ppun is the probability that D chooses to play Pun and Φ (·) is the standard normal
cumulative distribution function (cdf). This implies that 1− ppun is the probability that D
selects ¬Pun.
The numerator in Equation 1 represents the observed components of D’s utility from
8QRE is consistent with other Nash-based concepts, such as perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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Pun. The denominator in Equation 1 represents the amount of uncertainty S has regarding
D’s utility. When S (and the analyst) are more certain, ppun is closer to either 0 or 1, while
less certainty moves ppun closer to 0.5. Thus, ppun reflects the analyst and S’s belief that D
will punish, while 1− ppun reflects the belief that D will acquiesce.
Moving up the game tree, we can derive S’s equilibrium strategies. When calculating its
expected utility from Chal, S takes into account D’s expected actions. This means that S
conditions its utility for Acq and Con based on the probability that D plays Pun, or ppun.
That is, U∗S (Chal) = (1− ppun) (U∗S (Acq)) + ppun (U∗S (Con)). The utility for playing ¬Chal
is simply U∗S (SQ). S selects Chal if and only if U
∗
S (Chal) > U
∗












ppun (piSCon) + (1− ppun) piSAcq − piSSQ

















where pchal is the probability that S selects Chal and Φ (·) is the standard normal cdf. This
implies that 1− pchal is the probability that S chooses ¬Chal.
The numerator in Equation 2 contains the difference in S’s expected utility for playing
Chal and ¬Chal. S is more likely to choose Chal when the observable parts of US (Chal)
increase relative to those of U∗S (SQ). The denominator again represents uncertainty, only
this time, the uncertainty is conditioned by the beliefs ppun and 1− ppun.
Equilibrium outcome probabilities are calculated from the products of the choice equilib-
ria of each player. The probability of observing the status quo is the same as the probability
that S plays ¬Chal. The probability that D acquiesces is equal to the product of S playing
Chal and D playing ¬Pun. Lastly, the probability of conflict is the product of S playing
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Chal and D playing Pun.
Pr (SQ) = 1− pchal (3)
Pr (Acq) = pchal (1− ppun) (4)
Pr (Con) = pchalppun (5)
Empirical Implications
The equilibria lead to a number of testable propositions. I focus on two here.
The first proposition links the changes in the degree of subordination between a subor-
dinate and dominant state to the likelihood of observing a challenge.
Proposition 1. (For proof, see Appendix A) Assuming that the subordinate state has at least
a moderate amount of uncertainty regarding the dominant’s expected utilities, pchal decreases
as HS increases. Thus, the probability of a challenge is negatively correlated with the degree
of subordination.
A change in HS has both a direct and an indirect effect on the utility of the subordinate
(note ppun in Equation 2). These effects act in opposite directions: an increase in subordina-
tion decreases the likelihood of a challenge (direct effect), yet it also decreases the probability
that the dominant will punish, as the relative target–challenger subordination decreases (in-
direct effect). The indirect effect represents a moral hazard—a possible emboldening effect of
closeness to the dominant (Machain and Morgan 2013; Smith 1995). Assuming that players
are at least moderately uncertain regarding other’s expected utilities, however, the direct ef-
fect is necessarily larger than the indirect effect, because the indirect effect enters S’s utility
as a part of the probability of punishment term, while the direct effect faces no such con-
straint. Despite its outstanding territorial claim against Belize (and military superiority),
Guatemala is highly subordinate to the US and, thus, unlikely to pursue military options.
It is not emboldened by its higher (relative to Belize) position in the US hierarchy, as long
as there is some uncertainty regarding a US response.
Hypothesis 1. States with higher subordination are less likely to challenge the status quo.
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The second proposition concerns the relationship between the relative degree of challenger–
target subordination and the probability of observing a punishment.
Proposition 2. (For proof, see Appendix A) The probability of a punishment, ppun, is pos-
itively affected by the relative difference in subordination between the target and challenger,
HT −HS.
Proposition 2 suggests that, from the perspective of a dominant, not all challenges are
equally disruptive. When deciding whether to punish a challenge, the dominant considers
the relative degree of subordination between the challenger and the target. The dominant is
less likely to punish challenges against target with lower levels of subordination (relative to
the challenger). For instance, even though the US did not authorize the Israeli bombing of
an Iraqi nuclear facility in 1981, Israel faced only minor repercussions for this action.
Hypothesis 2. Dominant states are more likely to punish challenges against targets with
greater subordination relative to the challenger.
This theoretical insight contributes and extends the general deterrence literature by treat-
ing the status of a prote´ge´ as a continuous and relational rather than a binary measure. The
concept of general deterrence is enriched by considering the implicit threat of retaliation
dependent on the location of the target and aggressor within dominant’s hierarchy. The
challenger’s decision to attack a target is affected by the target’s relative degree of subordi-
nation and the associated risk of punishment.
Research Design
The above theoretical framework is very general: one can use it to study the effects of
social hierarchy at the regional or global level, or even in the presence of several competing
dominant states. The empirical tests conducted in this paper, however, focus on exploring
the effects of US social hierarchy between 1950-2000. Appropriate to this time period, the
US is treated as the dominant state, the USSR/Russia is treated as an alternative dominant,
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and all other states are coded as subordinates with varying degrees of subordination to either
dominant.9
The unit of analysis is directed-dyad-year. Directed-dyad-years account for both the
actions of state A towards state B and state B towards state A. This unit of analysis allows
for identification of the conflict initiator in the first stage of the analysis—the challenger of
the status quo—and whether this action is punished by the dominant state in the second
stage. The analysis is temporally constrained to 1950-2000 due to data availability on the
degree of subordination explanatory variable. I measure subordination using data originally
generated by Lake (2009, Ch 3). I have data for 141 countries, which yields a sample of
549,576 non-missing observations.
Methodology
I conduct the analysis using a two-stage strategic probit model (Bas, Signorino and Walker
2008). A two-stage strategic probit is effectively a recursive system of equations, where
estimates from later stages are used to improve parameter estimates from earlier stages, i.e.
statistical backwards induction (Bas, Signorino and Walker 2008, 26-27). The estimator
is able to separate the constraining effects of social hierarchy (i.e. the preference for the
status quo) from the deterring effects of punishment, which is achieved by accounting for
the challengers’ strategic selection of targets.10 A failure to model this selection effect would
produce biased estimates and incorrect inferences (Signorino and Yilmaz 2003).
In substantive terms, the estimator treats subordinate states as able to calculate their
expected utilities from a challenge by estimating the probability of a punishment from other
observed cases of challenges. The subordinate uses this estimated probability, or a belief
regarding the threat of punishment, to weigh its costs and benefits from challenging the
status quo. This allows the estimator to effectively isolate the independent effects of the
predictors, such as the pacifying effects of subordination, from the deterring effects of military
9For the sake of consistency, states not aligned with either of the dominants are defined as subordinates
with 0-degree of subordination. Such states make up the plurality of the sample (approximately 61%).
10In contrast to a bivariate selection model, strategic models treat an actor’s choice in the first stage as a
function of both its own expected behavior and the expected behavior of the other actor in the second stage.
14











capabilities and relative target-challenger subordination, by allowing both challenge and
punishment to have their own equation within the random utility model.
Figure 2 displays the empirical specification of the strategic model, where the observ-
able components of the theoretical model are represented by a set of regressors Xij . The
discrete nature of actor choices in Equations 1 and 2 allows for estimating the parameters
of these regressors using two probit models, assuming variance is normally distributed with
σ2 = 1 (Bas, Signorino and Walker 2008). Consistent with the functional form of the theo-
retical model, I first estimate the probability of a punishment (Equation 2).11 This provides
estimates for βD22 as well as for p, the subordinate’s belief that the dominant punishes a
challenge. A larger value of p is associated with a greater belief that punishment is likely.
The subordinate’s expected value for challenging can be calculated by multiplying p and
the regressors XS22 , while the constant from the Acquiesce outcome is multiplied by (1− p).
The modified regressors are necessary to account for the expected action of the dominant
state when challenging. These modified regressors and the unmodified status quo regres-
sors XS11 are then used in a probit model to identify the probability that the subordinate
challenges (Equation 1).12 Finally, I calculate the standard errors for coefficients related to
the subordinate’s action using nonparametric bootstraps, because the subordinate’s choice is
conditioned by the expected action of the dominant (Bas, Signorino and Walker 2008, 29).13
11The dominant’s utility from acquiesce outcome is normalized to 0.
12The same variable cannot be included in every outcome or the model cannot be identified. I exclude a
constant in XS22 .
13See Appendix B for a more technical discussion.
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Dependent Variables
The first dependent variable—Challenge—indicates whether a state challenges the status
quo. Given US frequent military involvement, its willingness to form coalitions, and, more
generally, its military capabilities and global interests, I argue that any challenger prefers
to act as part of a coalition with the US, if at all possible.14 A failure to convince the US
to support the conflict from day one is, therefore, indicative of a lack of US support, and
hence, constitutes a challenge (at least in a nominal sense).15
Then, in accordance to this paper’s theoretical framework, international disputes in
the second half of the 20th century can be thought of as falling into one of two cate-
gories: (1) those initiated by the US or by another state with US support or authoriza-
tion, and (2) those that were initiated without US authorization. The latter group of
disputes constitutes challenges—to some degree—of the US-established status quo. The
strength of the challenge—captured in this study by the concept of relative target-challenger
subordination—is an independent variable influencing how the US responds to a challenge
and is discussed later.
Challenge, therefore, is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if state A initiates a militarized
interstate dispute (MID), defined as the threat, display or use of military force, without the
US as originator on the same side. An independent dispute initiation is treated as an attempt
to alter the status quo without approval from the dominant state. MID data are obtained
from the Correlates of War project (Palmer et al. 2015). I exclude joiners—states which
become conflict participants after the first day of a dispute—because they did not initiate a
conflict, but may have been drawn in by an alliance or saw fighting spillover onto their soil
(e.g., Syria’s involvement in a 1994 clash between Israel and Lebanon).
14Great powers have a higher than average tendency toward conflict initiation (Chiba, Machain and Reed
2014). The US and other major powers frequently build coalitions—the US has been a coalition member in all
of its modern wars—or seek authorization from international bodies prior to initiating conflicts (Krahmann
2005; Tago 2007).
15A possible alternative way of “authorizing” aggressor action is via arms transfers. Evidence regarding
arms transfers inciting interstate conflict, however, is mixed. While the initial transfer of arms is found to
produce more aggressive foreign policies, arms dependence restrains this effect (Craft 1999; Kinsella 1998).
Thus, the presence of arms transfers on its own does not necessarily indicate support for initiating a conflict,
nor does it identify an approved target. In contrast, involvement as a conflict originator is a clear signal of
support.
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Given the general willingness of the US to resort to military means when it seeks inter-
national change, as well as its tendency to form coalitions or aid allies, states that initiate
conflict without initial US support must find their existing situation unacceptable and are
unwilling to compromise their aims to the extent that is necessary to gain US support (Mor-
row 1991, 909). While the US may offer to support an ally’s aggressive actions later, the
lack of the initial US support suggests that it did not want a conflict to occur, at least at
that particular time. Hence, such conflict initiation represents at least a nominal challenge
to US authority.
The second dependent variable represents the dominant’s (coercive) responses to challenges—
punishments. Punishments are operationalized as a dichotomous variable indicating whether
the US either initiated a MID or issued economic sanctions against the challenger in the
same or following year as the challenge.16 MIDs and economic sanctions are only consid-
ered a punishment if the subordinate has already initiated a challenge. Data related to the
threat or use of sanctions are gathered from the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES)
dataset (Morgan, Krustev and Bapat 2006). Sanctions are coded as “actions such as tar-
iffs, export controls, embargoes, import bans, travel bans, freezing assets, cutting foreign
aid, and/or blockades” (Morgan, Krustev and Bapat 2006, 1). The measure includes both
military and economic actions, since they may be substitutes. In the sample, about 26%
(169/652) of all Challenges are Punished. Approximately 64% (109/169) of all Punishments
within the sample involve MIDs—about one-fifth of which are used in conjunction with
economic sanctions (34/109)—with the exclusive use of economic sanctions making up the
remaining 36% (60/169).17
Independent Variables
I argue that subordination increases the subordinate’s value for the status quo (XS11). The
measures of subordination are obtained from Lake (2009, Ch 3) and are measured on a
continuous scale, consistent with the theory developed here. Subordination is measured along
16See Appendix C for robustness checks using various punishment operationalizations.
17Peterson and Drury (2011) also find that sanctions and MIDs are sometimes used together.
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two dimensions: security and economic.18 US Security Subordination is operationalized as
the composite of two measures. The first is based on the number of US Military Personnel.
It is measured as #Military Personnel
#Host Population
.19 Lake (2009, 69) argues that “to the extent that B
accepts A’s personnel on a continuing basis, this control can be regarded as legitimate and,
therefore, authoritative” (see also Morrow 1991, 905). A subordinate’s acceptance of the
dominant’s troops signals a (tacit) acceptance of their authority. The measure models the
relational nature of hierarchy: both the dominant and the subordinate must agree to the
troop placements (e.g., the territory holds strategic value).20
The second measure of US Security Subordination is related to the number of allies
that the subordinate shares with the dominant as a proportion of all formal alliances. The
logic here is that states with non-diversified alliance portfolios are more accepting of the
dominant state’s foreign policy (Morrow 1991). The measure implies that alliance net-
works anchored around key states provide more information about foreign policy prefer-
ences than a more general measure of alliance similarity. Shared Alliances is measured as
1
State i’s # of Independent Alliances
, where state i is assumed to always be allied with itself, to avoid
undefined values (Lake 2009, fn 13). Larger values on Shared Alliances are associated with
fewer independent allies and greater level of subordination. The security subordination vari-
ables are not highly correlated (r = 0.17), suggesting they are capturing different aspects
of security hierarchy. Higher values of either measure are associated with greater security
subordination.
The second dimension captures US Economic Subordination. This is also the composite
of two measures. The first is related to exchange rates. A state’s autonomy over its exchange
rate directly affects its control over its monetary policy and, therefore, proxies the level of
economic subordination. This measure seems an especially appropriate measure of author-
ity “since exchange rates are typically chosen with only minimal pressure from the anchor
18The formal model makes no a priori assumption regarding the number of hierarchies that may affect
conflict behavior. I include both security and economic issue dimensions because these have traditionally
been the most salient within IR research.
19To ease spatial and temporal comparability, each subordination measure is normalized to 1 by dividing
by the highest value in 1995 (Lake 2009, 69).
20While post-war occupation hardly seems like granting “permission,” post-war governments decide
whether to continue the arrangement, e.g., contrast West Germany and contemporary Afghanistan.
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country, but are nevertheless constraining...” (Lake 2009, 73). Exchange Rate is coded on
a four-point scale using IMF measures where higher scores indicate greater subordination.
These are, in order of most to least autonomous: floating exchanges, crawling peg, fixed
exchange, and “merged” or “dollarization.” Floating exchange rates change value according
to market forces and include most of the world’s major currencies (e.g., the Euro, Japanese
yen, British pound, and US dollar). Crawling pegs are currencies that ‘float’ within a speci-
fied range of a foreign currency or a bundle of foreign currencies (e.g., Chinese yuan). Fixed
exchange rates were used by most countries during the 1950s–1960s under Bretton Woods.
Lastly, dollarization refers to pegging one’s currency directly to a foreign currency, such as
the US dollar (e.g., Ecuador, El Salvador, and Panama).
The second measure captures subordinates’ trade dependence on the dominant compared
to other major powers in the system. Similar to the independent allies argument, failure to
diversify trading partners is viewed as an acceptance of the dominant’s hierarchy. Trade De-
pendence is measured as (State i’s Trade with the US)−(State i’s Trade with Other Major Powers)
State i’s GDP
, where state
i’s trade with other major powers is truncated at zero.21 As with security measures, measures
of economic subordination are not highly correlated (r = 0.23).
The measures of subordination, described above, capture a contractual relational power
that exists independent of coercive military power. In fact, neither the Security nor Eco-
nomic dimensions of subordination are highly correlated with traditional measures of military
power, such as the Power Ratio (r = −0.09 and r = 0.01, respectively). This means that a
stronger state in terms of coercive capabilities, such as Great Britain or Japan, is nearly as
likely to defer to the US as leader of a social hierarchy, as a weaker state, such as El Salvador
or New Zealand. Finally, Security and Economic Subordination capture different types of
hierarchy, as they are only correlated at r = 0.25.
The second primary explanatory variable is Relative Target-Challenger Subordination,
which affects the likelihood that the dominant punishes a challenge (XD22). Relative Target-
Challenger Subordination reflects the hierarchical position of a challenger in reference to
21Other major powers are defined as Great Britain, China, France, or Russia. Lake’s original data do not
include trade dependence or composite economic subordination figures for the other major powers. I add
these countries to the data.
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a target state within a dominant state’s social hierarchy. As noted earlier, the dominant
does not equally weigh all challenges. This variable represents the severity of a challenge as
it is viewed by the dominant state; hence, Relative Subordination is measured as Target −
Challenger for all subordinate dyads along both the security and economic dimensions. Thus,
targets with greater relative subordination (than the challenger) have positive values on
Relative Subordination: the dominant has a greater utility of punishing challenges against
such targets.22 This measure captures the importance of a challenge to the US.
To account for the presence of an alternative hierarchy, I create a variable which captures
a state’s subordination to the USSR/Russia within the security domain—USSR/Russia Se-
curity Subordination. USSR/Russia Security Subordination is analogous to the US security
subordination, yet is limited to just the shared alliances measure. Greater USSR/Russia
subordination is expected to deter the US from punishing, as a punishment may trigger
USSR/Russia involvement (i.e. the alternative dominant may seek to fulfill its obligation to
defend subordinates within its own hierarchy).
The literature identifies a number of material factors that influence interstate conflict,
such as the power ratio, shared borders, and joint democracy, among others (e.g., Russett and
Oneal 2001).23 Table 2 lists the full set of control variables, which equation they are included
in, their expected effect, and how they are measured.24 Control variables are discussed in
more detail in Appendix D.
Empirical Analysis
Table 3 presents the results of the strategic probit. Following the practice in the literature
(e.g., Nieman 2015), the table of results is subdivided into four parts, which correspond to
22When the challenger has greater relative subordination than the target, Relative Subordination takes on
negative values. This, of course, does not mean that the dominant prefers that the challenger attacks these
targets, only that these targets are less important to the dominant.
23I do not include a dummy variable for the Cold War, as superpower ties are subsumed by the concepts
of US and USSR/Russia subordination. Appendix C reports a model where a Cold War dummy is included;
the primary results do not change.
24Nieman (2015, 438-439) demonstrates that strategic models are relatively robust to inclusion of spurious
variables, and even to misplacement of variables in utility equations.
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Table 2: Control Variables and Measures
Variable Utility Sign Measure
USSR/Russia Security Subordinationa XD22 − 1State i’s # of Independent Alliances
Power Ratiob XD22 , XS22 +,+
CINC A
CINC A+CINC B





Power Changeb XD22 + CINCt − CINCt−1
Civil Warc XS22 − Binary: 1 if civil war
Ongoing US MIDsd XD22 − Count of US MIDs at t
Previous Challenged XD22 , XS22 +,− Count of previous challenges at t
Contiguitye XS22 + Binary: 1 if shared border




Joint Democracyg XD22 , XS22 −,− Binary: 1 if both ≥ 6 on Polity2
Alliancea XS22 − Binary: 1 if defense pact
a Gibler (2009)
b Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) (Singer 1987)
c Sarkees (2000)
d Palmer et al. (2015)
e Bennett and Stam (2000)
f Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins (2009)
g Marshall and Jaggers (2008)
See Appendix D for expanded coding rules and utility placement explanations.
each of the estimated equations: Dominant’s Conflict, Subordinate’s Status Quo, Subordi-
nate’s Acquiescence, and Subordinate’s Conflict. Positive (negative) coefficients are inter-
preted as increasing (decreasing) the corresponding actor’s utility from the given outcome.
For example, a positive coefficient under Subordinate’s Status Quo indicates that the asso-
ciated regressor increases the subordinate’ utility with the status quo and, all else equal,
decreases its likelihood of challenging.25
The coefficient on US Security Subordination is positive and statistically significant in
the Subordinate’s Status Quo equation, while the coefficient on US Economic Subordination
is insignificant. The positive result on US Security Subordination indicates that states with
higher levels of subordination (in the security hierarchy) are more likely to value the status
quo, relative to other outcomes (i.e. conflict and acquiescence). This is consistent with
Hypothesis 1, which posited an inverse relationship between states’ degree of subordination
25See Appendix C for robustness checks.
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Table 3: Militarized Challenge and Punishment in US Hierarchy.
Actor Subordinate Dominant
Status Quo Equation:
US Security Subordination 0.185∗∗∗ (0.56)





Relative US Security Subordination 1.032∗∗∗ (0.214)
Relative US Economic Subordination 0.284∗ (0.160)
USSR/Russia Security Subordination −0.393† (0.275)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio 4.788∗∗∗ (0.806)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio2 −4.016∗∗∗ (0.690)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio 0.361∗∗∗ (0.081)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio2 −0.243∗∗∗ (0.049)
Power Change −0.111 (0.380)
Ongoing US MIDs 0.080∗ (0.047)
Civil War 0.495∗∗∗ (0.169)




Challenger-Target Joint Democracy −1.025∗∗∗ (0.232)
Dominant-Subordinate Joint Democracy −0.439∗∗∗ (0.144)




Note: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1, two-tailed; +p <0.1, one-tailed. Subordi-
nate S.E. are bootstrapped (500 simulations).
and the probability of challenging.
Relative US Security Subordination is positive and statistically significant in the Dom-
inant’s Conflict equation. This indicates that the dominant is more likely to punish chal-
lengers, when the target has a higher relative subordination (than the challenger) within the
US security hierarchy. The coefficient on Relative US Economic Subordination is statistically
significant at the 0.1 level, offering evidence that “low politics” are an important considera-
tion in the dominant’s punishment calculus. These results provide support for Hypothesis 2,
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which posited that the US is more likely to punish challenges, directed against targets with
higher relative subordination.
It is worth highlighting that the USSR/Russia Security Subordination is negative and
statistically significant (p-value< 0.1, one-tailed test). This indicates that the US is less
likely to punish challengers who are subordinate to an alternative dominant state. Most of
the other control variables have the expected effects or are statistically insignificant. A few
of the results, however, are surprising. Subordinate states engaged in Civil War are more
likely to initiate challenges in the Subordinate’s Conflict equation. This may highlight the
transnational aspects of civil war (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Trade is also positive and
statistically significant (p-value< 0.1, one-tailed test), suggesting that, once social hierarchy
is accounted for, increased trade between subordinates is associated with a greater probability
of conflict.
Table 3, of course, does not provide an easy way to gauge the net effect of social hierarchy,
which enters the model in two separate ways—in the Subordinate’s Status Quo equation (via
the degree of subordination variable) and in the Dominant’s Punishment equation (via the
relative subordination variable). To account for the net effect of changes in a state’s subordi-
nation, Figure 3 presents predicted probabilities for each of the three outcomes (status quo,
acquiescence, and conflict between the dominant and challenger). Predicted probabilities
are calculated by varying the challenger’s security subordination, while holding the target’s
security subordination constant at either the 5th, 50th or the 95th percentile (to reflect targets
with low, medium, or high degree of subordination).26 To make the predicted probabilities
more substantively meaningful, I examine each outcome for the situation where challengers
share a border with the target, while all other variables are held at their me median values.27
Figure 3 illustrates four substantively important results. First, increasing challenger’s
subordination (going from left to right within each sub-figure) is associated with a declining
probability of challenge (solid line). This is consistent with the theoretical expectation that
26Note that increasing/decreasing challenger’s (absolute) subordination leads to increases/decreases in the
relative subordination between challenger and target (even through target’s subordination remains constant
in absolute terms).
27I focus on neighboring states to give a substantively important scenario (Signorino and Tarar 2006, 596).
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Note: Predicted probabilities for contiguous states with all other variables held at median.
Challenge Conflict Acquiesce
states with greater (absolute) subordination are more accepting of the status quo and are
less likely to challenge. Second, dominants are always more likely to acquiesce (short dashed
line) than punish/engage in conflict with the challenger (long dashed line). Third, comparing
the probability of conflict (long dashed line) among the three sub-figures (from left to right),
we can see that there is a positive relationship between the target’s subordination and the
probability of dominant-subordinate conflict. The probability of conflict is greater as we
move from targets with low to medium subordination, and as we move from the targets with
medium to high absolute subordination.
Fourth, comparing the probability of challenge (solid line) among the three sub-figures
(from left to right) show that the targets with greater (relative) subordination are at the
highest risk of being attacked, even though such challenges are the most likely to be punished
by the dominant (as demonstrated in Figure 4 and discussed below). The higher rate of chal-
lenges against highly subordinate targets (compared to that against targets with moderate
or low subordination) provides face validity to the conceptualization/measure of a challenge,
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adopted here. In other words, we should expect that, if independently (of the US) initiated
military conflicts are indeed challenges to the US hierarchy (rather than just expressions of
settling scores among states), then most of such conflict initiation will be directed against
states that are more subordinate to the US, as they are. For example, unable to reach the
US, North Korea frequently threatens Japan—a state with high security subordination to
the US. Similarly, Iran has frequently linked its threats to the US with its threats to Israel.
Finally and related to the previous result, highly subordinate challengers (the right-hand
side of each sub-figure) are more likely to initiate challenges against highly subordinate tar-
gets than against targets with moderate or low subordination. Taken together with the first
point above, this result suggest an intriguing pattern of behavior among US subordinates:
states with high subordination rarely challenge, but when they do, they tend to attack highly
subordinate targets. This may be a result of selection: i.e. US subordinates only select into
independent conflicts when they are highly motivated, and thus, are less likely to be deterred.
Another possible explanation is that the result is an artifact of the data: hierarchy tends
to be clustered geographically. Though militarized disputes are rarely observed in Latin
America and Western Europe, those that take place tend to involve two states that are close
to the US (as most states in these regions are highly vested in the US security and economic
hierarchies).28
Figure 4 shows the proportion of challenges that result in conflict, as opposed to acquies-
cence, on the part of the dominant. If we move from left to right across the sub-figures, we
can see that the probability of conflict between the dominant and the challenger increases
with the targets degree of subordination. While dominants are always more likely to ac-
quiesce to challenges than to punish, they are especially likely to acquiesce when the target
is positioned lower than the challenger that vice versa. This is illustrated by the declining
slope of the line as the degree of hierarchy increases in each of the graphs.
28Using the difference in degree of subordination—relative US subordination—helps to properly identify
effects that might otherwise be obscured in the presence of spatial clustering. See Appendix C for additional
robustness checks, in which both types of subordination are included in both dominant and subordinate
states equations, as well as models with regional dummies.
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Note: Predicted probabilities for contiguous states with all other variables held at median.
Punishments
Conclusion
The account of social hierarchy developed and tested in this paper sheds new light on the
strategic causes of international conflict. It highlights that states exist in a strategic environ-
ment; rather than simply a function of dyadic covariates, conflictual and peaceful interactions
between pairs of states affected by factors beyond dyadic level of analysis, such as the social
relationships/hierarchies within the international system. I am able to empirically isolate
the effects of social hierarchy on subordinate states propensity to initiate conflicts from the
deterring effects of material power, using a two-stage strategic probit estimator. The results
suggest that variation in the degree of authority conferred to a dominant has wide ranging
consequences on 3rd-party interactions.
The theory developed in the manuscript helps explain several recent conflicts. Despite
increasing hostile rhetoric from both the Philippines and China, for example, there has
been only one MID between these states during the 2002-2010 period (Palmer et al. 2015).
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Such a peaceful, albeit uneasy, relationship, is consistent with the theoretical model, as the
Philippines are tightly embedded within the US-alliance network, and are, therefore, less
likely to attempt to revise the status quo by initiating disputes (as US policymakers have a
strong preference for avoiding possible confrontation with China). China, similarly, seeks to
avoid confrontation with a state close to the US.
The paper suggests several directions for future research. Extending the operational-
ization of challenge to include additional actions, such as shifts between social hierarchies,
could help explain other instances where dominant states intervene in other states, such as
Russia’s incursions into Georgia and Ukraine following the latter governments’ shifts towards
Europe. Extending the framework to include intra- and extra-state actors would also allow
it to intersect with recent work by Bapat (2006), who shows that states that host extra-state
terrorist organizations affect the ability of target states to negotiate with terrorist groups.
By treating the degree of subordination of dissatisfied political minorities (to either a do-
mestic or external sponsor) as a continuous variable, we can expand our explanatory power
of the political minority groups’ decision to mobilize within the existing political structure,
or choosing to take up arms
Future research could also explore the interaction between multiple hierarchical dimen-
sions. The empirical results demonstrate, for example, that while relative target—challenger
economic subordination affects the probability of punishment, the challenger’s degree of eco-
nomic subordination is not a significant predictor of challenging. This suggests that the two
different types of social hierarchy impact the behavior of dominants and subordinates in
different ways: while subordination within the economic hierarchy matters to dominants, it
seems to have a smaller and indirect effect on the decisions of subordinates (by increasing
the probability of punishment). Future research could explore the varying deterring effects
of hierarchies on the dominant and subordinates, as well as the possible over-lap in the
effects of different dimensions of hierarchy (e.g., does security hierarchy deter economic chal-
lenges?). This direction can also build upon Liu (2014), who explores the effect of language
hierarchies on economic activities. Finally, one can explore the role of hierarchies in policy
diffusion (e.g., Gift and Krcmaric 2015; Weymouth and MacPherson 2012).
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The paper may also contribute to several literatures beyond the study of inter-state
conflict. The theoretical framework is very general; it applies to the broad class of strategic
interactions between actors with asymmetrical power, such as government-rebel negotiations
during an intra-state crisis, opposition parties or factions bargaining among themselves or
with the ruling party, or even the interaction between international investors and borrowers.
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Appendix A Proposition Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
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(6)
where f(·) is the probability density function and z = HT−HS−CD−A√
2σ2
. The first term is positive
since it is a probability density, the first product of the second term is negative owing to the
sign on CS, while the sign of the second term is unclear, as BT − CS can be either positive
or negative in the second product of the second term. When BT − CS is positive, then the
derivative is negative; when BT −CS is negative, then the sign of the derivative depends on
the difference between the first and second products of the second term, which is determined,
in part, on the value of σ. This means that the probability of S selecting chal depends on
both the sign associated with the difference of BT − CS and its level of certainty in D’s
expected utilities, represented by σ. Smaller values of σ represent greater certainty on the
part of S.
I ran several simulations in order to identify the effect of HS at varying levels of σ when
BT − CS is either positive, negative, or zero. Figure A.1 presents the first general pattern
that emerges from these simulations when CD ≥ 0.3 or A ≥ 0.3. Figure A.1 shows that,
under this scenario, whether BT −CS is either positive or negative, pchal always decreases as
HS increases. This result holds regardless of the value of σ.
I repeat the above simulations under several scenarios. Only under one set of conditions
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is there ever a non-monotonic relationship between pchal and HS: when CD < 0.3 or A < 0.3,
and σ is small (e.g. σ = 0.1). The most sharp non-monotonic relationship between pchal and
HS is found when CD = 0.15 or A = 0.15. These results are shown in Figure A.2. When
BT − CS is either zero or negative, the relationship between pchal and HS is non-monotonic
when σ is small, as evident by the short dashed line in the second and third graphs in Figure
A.2. As σ increases, however, the relationship between pchal and HS becomes negative and
strictly monotonic (solid and long dashed lines, respectively). When BT − CS is positive,
however, even under conditions where CD or A less than 0.3 and regardless of the value of
σ, pchal monotonically decreases as HS increases.
More substantively, it is only when a subordinate is moderately close to the dominant, the
expected benefits of attacking the target are greater than the costs imposed by the dominant
(should it punish), the costs to punish for the dominant and the expected costs imposed by
the alternative dominant are fairly low (both A and cD are less than 0.3), and the degree of
certainty on the part of the subordinate is very high (e.g., σ = 0.1), that subordinates are
more emboldened than constrained. If these conditions do not apply, than subordinates are
more constrained than emboldened in the foreign policy actions. The key point as applies
to the current application, is that the results demonstrate that if S is at least a moderate
amount of uncertainty regarding the dominant’s expected utilities (e.g., σ = .25), then the
relationship between HS and pchal is strictly negative.
Proof of Proposition 2.





HT −HS − CD − A√
2σ2
)√
2σ2 ≥ 0 (7)
where f is the probability density function. The product of a probability density function
and square root is always either positive or zero, as both terms are either positive or zero.
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Appendix B Statistical Backwards Induction
Consistent with the theory outlined above, subordinates with high absolute hierarchy are
expected to maintain the status quo. Thus, XS11 represents absolute hierarchy, which is
treated as the observable component of the utility function depicted in Figure 2. This can
be written formally as US (¬Chal) = βS11XS11 . Standard explanations of why a subordinate
would initiate a conflict against a target are captured by observable variables represented
by XS22 , while the subordinate’s utility from the dominant state acquiescing to a challenge
is captured by a parameter, βS21 . Each outcome depends on the expected action of the
dominant, where p represents the subordinate’s belief that the dominant will punish and
1− p that it will not punish. Thus, the subordinate’s expected utility from challenging can
be rewritten as US (Chal) = p (βS22XS22) + (1− p) (βS21).
The expectations associated with the dominant state are represented by XD22 , which
captures the relative hierarchy between a challenging subordinate and their target. This can
be written as UD (Pun) = βD22XD22 . Finally, the acquiescence outcome for the dominant is
normalized to zero, or UD (¬Pun) = 0.
Consistent with the SBI principles, the second stage of the model (the dominant’s re-
sponse to a challenge) is estimated first, and the resulting expectation is used to condition
the behavior in the first stage (the subordinate’s decision to challenge). If the variance is as-
sumed to be normally distributed with σ2 = 1, the probability that UD (Pun) > UD (¬Pun)
in cases where a challenge occurred can be estimated using a probit model (Bas, Signorino
and Walker 2008). This provides estimates for βD22 as well as for p, the subordinate’s belief
that the dominant punishes a challenge. A larger value of p is associated with a greater
belief that punishment is likely.
The subordinate’s expected value for challenging can be calculated by multiplying p by
the regressors XS22 , while the constant from the Acquiesce outcome is multiplied by (1− p).
This mimics the theoretical structure depicted in Figure 1 by conditioning the expected
benefits of a challenging state by the risk of punishment. These modified regressors are then
included in a probit model identifying the probability that US (Chal) > US (¬Chal), which is
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the likelihood that the subordinate challenges (Bas, Signorino and Walker 2008, 7-9, 18-19).
Modified regressors are necessary, because using first-order regressors would ignore that the
variables associated with a challenge are conditioned by the expected action of the dominant
state and, hence, produce biased and inconsistent parameters (Signorino and Yilmaz 2003).
The use of the strategic model allows for isolating the effects of each theoretically relevant
factor for both subordinate and dominant states.
Calculating the standard errors (SEs) is slightly more complicated. SEs for coefficients
related to the dominant’s choice require no modification because the dominant’s choice does
not depend on the expected actions of anyone else (Bas, Signorino and Walker 2008, 29).
Instead, the dominant acts only when a subordinate challenges. Potential problems arise,
however, when calculating SEs associated with the subordinate’s coefficients because the
subordinate’s decision is conditioned by the expected action of the dominant state. Ignoring
this conditional relationship would produce inconsistent SEs. To account for this, I employ
nonparametric bootstraps.
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Appendix C Robustness Tables
Table C.1: Militarized Challenge and Punishment in US Hierarchy, with
USSR/Russia as an Alternative Hierarchy in a Subordinate’s Status Quo Equation.
Actor Subordinate Dominant
Status Quo Equation:
US Security Subordination 0.197∗∗∗ (0.063)
US Economic Subordination 0.007 (0.0487)





Relative US Security Subordination 1.032∗∗∗ (0.214)
Relative US Economic Subordination 0.284∗ (0.160)
USSR/Russia Security Subordination −0.393† (0.275)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio 4.779∗∗∗ (0.778)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio2 −3.964∗∗∗ (0.666)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio 0.361∗∗∗ (0.081)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio2 −0.243∗∗∗ (0.049)
Power Change −0.170 (0.407)
Ongoing US MIDs 0.080∗ (0.047)
Civil War 0.512∗∗∗ (0.150)




Challenger-Target Joint Democracy −1.035∗∗∗ (0.228)
Dominant-Subordinate Joint Democracy −0.439∗∗∗ (0.144)




Note: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1, two-tailed; +p <0.1, one-tailed. Subordi-
nate S.E. are bootstrapped (500 simulations).
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Table C.2: Militarized Challenge and Punishment in US Hierarchy, with Global
Power substituted in place of USSR/Russia Security Subordination.
Actor Subordinate Dominant
Status Quo Equation:
US Security Subordination 0.198∗∗∗ (0.055)





Relative US Security Subordination 0.941∗∗∗ (0.219)
Relative US Economic Subordination 0.225† (0.163)
Global Power −0.074∗∗∗ (0.015)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio 5.110∗∗∗ (0.789)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio2 −4.151∗∗∗ (0.664)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio 0.360∗∗∗ (0.081)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio2 −0.239∗∗∗ (0.049)
Power Change −0.149 (0.341)
Ongoing US MIDs 0.061† (0.047)
Civil War 0.506∗∗∗ (0.158)




Challenger-Target Joint Democracy −0.945∗∗∗ (0.190)
Dominant-Subordinate Joint Democracy −0.392∗∗∗ (0.143)




Note: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1, two-tailed; +p <0.1, one-tailed. Subordi-
nate S.E. are bootstrapped (500 simulations).
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Table C.3: Militarized Challenge and Punishment in US Hierarchy, Including both
USSR/Russia Security Subordination and Global Power.
Actor Subordinate Dominant
Status Quo Equation:
US Security Subordination 0.189∗∗∗ (0.054)





Relative US Security Subordination 0.941∗∗∗ (0.219)
Relative US Economic Subordination 0.232† (0.163)
USSR/Russia Security −0.189 (0.275)
Global Power −0.072∗∗∗ (0.015)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio 5.072∗∗∗ (0.794)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio2 −4.139∗∗∗ (0.677)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio 0.363∗∗∗ (0.081)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio2 −0.243∗∗∗ (0.050)
Power Change −0.192 (0.329)
Ongoing US MIDs 0.060 (0.047)
Civil War 0.513∗∗∗ (0.147)




Challenger-Target Joint Democracy −0.961∗∗∗ (0.218)
Dominant-Subordinate Joint Democracy −0.413∗∗∗ (0.147)




Note: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1, two-tailed; +p <0.1, one-tailed. Subordi-
nate S.E. are bootstrapped (500 simulations).
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Table C.4: Militarized Challenge and Punishment in US Hierarchy. Subordination




Shared Alliances 0.143∗∗∗ (0.033)
Military Personnel 0.031 (0.040)
US Economic Subordination
Trade Dependence −0.161† (0.103)





Relative US Security Subordination
Shared Alliances 0.484∗∗∗ (0.129)
Military Personnel 0.640∗∗ (0.296)
Relative US Economic Subordination
Trade Dependence 0.128 (0.260)
Exchange Rate 0.205† (0.139)
USSR/Russia Security Subordination −0.395† (0.275)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio 4.897∗∗∗ (0.803)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio2 −4.076∗∗∗ (0.669)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio 0.361∗∗∗ (0.081)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio2 −0.243∗∗∗ (0.049)
Power Change −0.105 (0.377)
Ongoing US MIDs 0.079∗ (0.047)
Civil War 0.472∗∗∗ (0.160)




Challenger-Target Joint Democracy −0.992∗∗∗ (0.211)
Dominant-Subordinate Joint Democracy −0.445∗∗∗ (0.145)




Note: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1, two-tailed; +p <0.1, one-tailed. Subordi-
nate S.E. are bootstrapped (500 simulations).
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Table C.5: Militarized Challenge and Punishment in US Hierarchy, All Subordination
Terms Included for Both Players (Dominant and Subordinate).
Actor Subordinate Dominant
Status Quo Equation:
US Security Subordination 0.188∗∗∗ (0.061)
US Economic Subordination 0.589 (0.055)





US Security Subordination 0.561∗ (0.319)
US Economic Subordination −0.087 (0.325)
Relative US Security Subordination −0.107 (0.087) 1.186∗∗∗ (0.232)
Relative US Economic Subordination −0.329∗∗ (0.165) 0.252 (0.209)
USSR/Russia Security −0.370† (0.281)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio 4.656∗∗∗ (0.786)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio2 −3.913∗∗∗ (0.683)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio 0.360∗∗∗ (0.083)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio2 −0.243∗∗∗ (0.051)
Power Change −0.176 (0.389)
Ongoing US MIDs 0.081∗ (0.047)
Civil War 0.574∗∗∗ (0.165)




Challenger-Target Joint Democracy −1.054∗∗∗ (0.212)
Dominant-Subordinate Joint Democracy −0.487∗∗∗ (0.146)




Note: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1, two-tailed; +p <0.1, one-tailed. Subordi-
nate S.E. are bootstrapped (500 simulations).
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US Security Subordination 0.176∗∗∗ (0.054)





Relative US Security Subordination 0.966∗∗∗ (0.212)
Relative US Economic Subordination 0.266dagger(0.162)
USSR/Russia Security −0.369† (0.276)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio 5.244∗∗∗ (0.876)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio2 −4.444∗∗∗ (0.732)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio 0.364∗∗∗ (0.081)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio2 −0.246∗∗∗ (0.049)
Power Change −0.132 (0.336)
Ongoing US MIDs 0.083∗ (0.048)
Civil War 0.480∗∗∗ (0.176)




Challenger-Target Joint Democracy −1.093∗∗∗ (0.245)
Dominant-Subordinate Joint Democracy −0.409∗∗∗ (0.145)




Note: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1, two-tailed; +p <0.1, one-tailed. Subordi-
nate S.E. are bootstrapped (500 simulations).
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Table C.7: Militarized Challenge and Punishment in US Hierarchy, Punishments
Include Only MIDs (excludes economic sanctions).
Actor Subordinate Dominant
Status Quo Equation:
US Security Subordination 0.206∗∗∗ (0.060)





Relative US Security Subordination 1.122∗∗∗ (0.238)
Relative US Economic Subordination 0.149 (0.184)
USSR/Russia Security −0.055 (0.338)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio 6.201∗∗∗ (1.125)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio2 −5.275∗∗∗ (0.973)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio 0.486∗∗∗ (0.102)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio2 −0.314∗∗∗ (0.063)
Power Change 0.999∗∗ (0.065)
Ongoing US MIDs 0.028 (0.057)
Civil War 0.258 (0.243)




Challenger-Target Joint Democracy −1.545 (1.455)
Dominant-Subordinate Joint Democracy −1.454∗∗∗ (0.256)




Note: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1, two-tailed; +p <0.1, one-tailed. Subordi-
nate S.E. are bootstrapped (500 simulations).
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Table C.8: Militarized Challenge and Punishment in US Hierarchy, Punishment In-
cludes Only Actual Uses of Force (MID> 3).
Actor Subordinate Dominant
Status Quo Equation:
US Security Subordination 0.196∗∗∗ (0.062)





Relative US Security Subordination 1.219∗∗∗ (0.228)
Relative US Economic Subordination 0.111 (0.174)
USSR/Russia Security −0.215 (0.308)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio 6.095∗∗∗ (1.012)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio2 −4.991∗∗∗ (0.865)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio 0.381∗∗∗ (0.090)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio2 −0.251∗∗∗ (0.056)
Power Change 0.355 (0.446)
Ongoing US MIDs −0.057 (0.053)
Civil War 0.414∗ (0.213)




Challenger-Target Joint Democracy −1.227∗∗ (0.513)
Dominant-Subordinate Joint Democracy −1.093∗∗∗ (0.201)




Note: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1, two-tailed; +p <0.1, one-tailed. Subordi-
nate S.E. are bootstrapped (500 simulations).
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US Security Subordination 0.197∗∗∗ (0.059)





Relative US Security Subordination 1.044∗∗∗ (0.215)
Relative US Economic Subordination 0.296∗ (0.161)
USSR/Russia Security −0.484∗ (0.283)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio 4.700∗∗∗ (0.788)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio2 −3.849∗∗∗ (0.677)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio 0.375∗∗∗ (0.082)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio2 −0.251∗∗∗ (0.050)
Power Change −0.143 (0.364)
Ongoing US MIDs 0.066† (0.048)
Civil War 0.451∗∗∗ (0.163)




Challenger-Target Joint Democracy −1.035∗∗∗ (0.212)
Dominant-Subordinate Joint Democracy −0.480∗∗∗ (0.147)
Challenger-Target Alliance −0.413∗∗ (0.201)




Note: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1, two-tailed; +p <0.1, one-tailed. Subordi-
nate S.E. are bootstrapped (500 simulations).
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US Security Subordination 0.185∗∗∗ (0.056)





Relative US Security Subordination 1.032∗∗∗ (0.214)
Relative US Economic Subordination 0.284∗ (0.160)
USSR/Russia Security Subordination −0.393† (0.275)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio 4.706∗∗∗ (0.783)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio2 −3.937∗∗∗ (0.672)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio 0.361∗∗∗ (0.081)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio2 −0.243∗∗∗ (0.049)
Power Change −0.114 (0.361)
Ongoing US MIDs 0.080∗ (0.047)
Civil War 0.502∗∗∗ (0.158)




Challenger-Target Joint Democracy −1.040∗∗∗ (0.233)
Dominant-Subordinate Joint Democracy −0.439∗∗∗ (0.144)
Challenger-Target Alliance −0.444∗∗ (0.214)




Note: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1, two-tailed; +p <0.1, one-tailed. Subordinate
S.E. are bootstrapped (500 simulations).
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Table C.11: Militarized Challenge and Punishment in US Hierarchy, Including Re-
gional Dummies to Account for Geographical Clustering in US Hierarchy.
Actor Subordinate Dominant
Status Quo Equation:
US Security Hierarchy 0.106∗∗ (0.052)





Relative US Security 0.953∗∗∗ (0.240)
Relative US Economic 0.101 (0.167)
USSR Security 0.123 (0.320)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio 3.947∗∗∗ (0.927)
Challenger-Target Power Ratio2 −3.586∗∗∗ (0.752)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio 0.444∗∗∗ (0.091)
Dominant-Subordinate Power Ratio2 −0.308∗∗∗ (0.056)
Power Change −0.001 (0.278)
Ongoing US MIDs 0.080† (0.049)
Civil War 0.300∗∗ (0.149)




Challenger-Target Joint Democracy 0.402∗∗ (0.166)
Dominant-Subordinate Joint Democracy −0.366∗∗ (0.153)
Challenger-Target Alliance −0.028 (0.180)
Europe 1.485∗∗∗ (0.253) −1.751∗∗∗ (0.338)
Middle East −0.028 (0.340) −0.773∗∗∗ (0.263)
Africa 1.225∗∗∗ (0.163) −0.188 (0.204)
North and Central Asia 0.920∗∗∗ (0.214) −1.287∗∗∗ (0.326)




Note: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1, two-tailed; +p <0.1, one-tailed. Subordi-
nate S.E. are bootstrapped (500 simulations).
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Appendix D Control Variables
The literature is the best guide of which controls to include: i.e., the models only include
control variables that have been consistently included in other recent studies of inter-state
conflict. I discuss the variable, measure, and justification for each control variable included
in the empirical model (by equation).
Subordinate Conflict Regressors (XS22)
Subordinate’s utility from challenging the status quo depends on a number of factors aside
from social hierarchy. States that are strong in terms of material power are expected to seek
greater autonomy. Three measures are used to represent a state’s military capabilities: power
ratio, squared power ratio and power change. These are measured using the Correlates of
War’s CINC variable, which measures a country’s power based upon economic and military
capabilities and population size (Singer 1987).29 Power ratio is measured as CINC A
CINC A+CINC B
.
In this equation, state A represents the potential challenger and B the potential target state.
Perfect preponderance would equal 1 and perfect symmetry would equal 0.5.
Power ratio and squared power ratio and capture the well-known non-linear relationship
between power and conflict (Bennett and Stam 2004; Kugler and Lemke 1996). A state is
more likely to initiate a conflict when its target is relatively equal to it in strength. States
with an overwhelming preponderance of power, on the other hand, are less likely to engage
in militarized disputes, as the weaker state will back down if confronted. The inclusion of
the squared term captures this non-linear effect.
Power change reflects the idea that rising states may be more dangerous, as they have
an expectation of continued growth and may seek to obtain more resources (Gerschenkron
1962; Doran 2003; Gilpin 1981) Power change is measured by subtracting State A’s CINC
score in the current year from its CINC score the previous year.
I also include a control for civil wars, which are expected to reduce the likelihood of a
29Economic capabilities are based upon a state’s iron and steel production and energy consumption. a
state’s military personnel and military expenditure compose its military capabilities. Finally, population
capabilities are configured as a state’s total population, as well as its urban population.
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challenge, as states experiencing a civil war are preoccupied with domestic concerns. Civil
war is defined as any conflict between the government and non-state actor with at least 1,000
battle deaths in a twelve month period. Civil wars are coded dichotomously and are obtained
from the Correlates of War project (Sarkees 2000). The number of previous challenges by
a state is also included in the analysis as conflict may be path dependent, with state pairs
viewing each other in more antagonistic terms with each additional conflict (Colaresi 2004;
Goertz and Diehl 1995; Thompson 2001). A large number of previous challenges could also
represent a state that is outside of the dominant’s hierarchy (i.e., non-aligned subordinate).
Subordinates are more likely to initiate challenges against contiguous neighbors. due to
both more frequent interaction and the fact that neighbors are more likely to have outstand-
ing, highly salient territorial disputes (Hensel 2001; Gibler 2012; Vasquez 1995). I treat
contiguity as a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates that states share a land border and
0 otherwise (Bennett and Stam 2000).30
The literature offers a number of theoretical expectations regarding the effect of trade on
subordinate-subordinate conflict (Barbieri and Schneider 1999). Trade may reduce conflict
by increasing ties and opportunity costs of fighting (Gartzke 2007; Russett and Oneal 2001;
Snidal 1991), though it could increase conflict as states become concerned with relative
gains (Barbieri 2002; Gowa 1989, 1994; Grieco 1988). I control for trade and measure it as
a percent of GDP using data from the Correlates of War project (Barbieri et. al. 2009).
Previous studies demonstrate that democracies are less likely to attack other democracies
(Reed 2000). Joint democracy may represent an ideological cost or operate as an institutional
constraint on leaders who wish to initiate a conflict (Bueno de Mesquita et al 1999; Maoz and
Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001). Democracy is measured using the 21 point Polity
score of the country where scores of 10 indicate democracy and scores of -10 autocracy
(Marshall and Jaggers 2008). Joint democracy is a dichotomous variable that is given a
value of 1 if both members have democracy scores of at least 6, and 0 otherwise.31
Finally, I account for whether a challenger and target have an alliance, as allies are
30Changing the operationalization of contiguity to include neighbors with 12 miles or even 400 miles of
open sea did not substantially alter the results.
31Other thresholds were used without altering the results in any meaningful way.
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expected to be less conflict prone (Leeds 2003; Mattes and Vonnahme 2010). Alliance data
are obtained from Gibler (2009).32
Dominant Conflict Regressors (XD22)
I control a number of other important factors that may influence a dominant state’s like-
lihood of punishing a challenge. In addition to several analogously motivated variables
(power ratio, power ratio squared, previous challenge, joint democracy), I account for several
other standard control variables that may influence whether the US punishes a challenger.
USSR/Russia security subordination captures the idea that the US might be less likely to
punish a challenge if the challenger is closely tied to Russia, as Russian hierarchy might
deter it (i.e. fear of confronting a major power). This variable is analogous to the measure
discussed by Lake (2009: Ch 3) for capturing the US security hierarchy. The USSR/Russia
measure, however, only includes the shared alliances measure, 1
State I’s # of Independent Alliances
.
Unfortunately, I was unable to generate an analogous economic subordination measure, due
to the lack of data for the Soviet era. The correlation between the US and USSR/Russia
security subordination is r = 0.19.33
Ongoing MIDs is a count variable tracking the total number of MIDs with US involvement
in a given year. This variable captures the idea that US resources (and resolve) are finite,
so involvement in a war on one theater ties up resources and increases the marginal costs of
entering a new conflict.
More distant locations increase the cost of fighting, as the costs of supporting troops
increases (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Lemke 2002).
This holds even if the dominant state has troops stationed in nearby states, as invading or
occupying a hostile country requires greater logistical prowess. Data regarding distance are
logged and obtained from EUgene (Bennett and Stam 2000).
I also control for the effect of previous challenges. In this equation, Previous challenges
32I include only pairs of states with defense pacts as allies. I have also analyzed results with other types
of alliance, with little effect on the main results.
33There is generally very little membership overlap between the US and USSR camps during the Cold
War, with only 12 country-years of joint membership. These 12 years consist of 6 each for Great Britain and
France, and are remnants of World War II, as each cancels their Soviet defense pact in 1955.
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help identify states that are completely outside of the US hierarchy; states that continuously
initiate disputes have demonstrated that they are unlikely to be deterred by the US.
It is noteworthy that any control variable in the Punishment equation do impact the
variables in the Challenge equation, through the subordinates expectation of punishment.
Finally, Global power represents the degree to which the dominant state has military
supremacy over other major powers. This variable intended to account for potential alter-
native social hierarchies that subordinates can turn to if the dominant (US) is failing at
providing political order (security). The logic behind this is simple supply and demand:
dominant states prefer that subordinates adhere to their interests, as opposed to those of an
alternative dominant. Providing benefits to subordinates, such as political security, however,
is costly. In the absence of credible alternative hierarchies, dominants are likely to reduce
the quality of benefits they provide in order to save costs. The theoretical expectation is
that an increase in Global Power (i.e., a increase in US power in relation to alternative dom-
inants) decreases the pressure on the dominant to provide order to its subordinates (similar
to the monopolistic competition idea). Analogously, when Global Power is low, US faces
stronger competition from alternative hierarchies (as strong alternative hierarchies are more
attractive to subordinates than weak alternative hierarchies); hence, the US has a greater
incentive to provide order to its subordinates. That is, the inverse of global power repre-
sented the latent risk of a subordinate joining an alternative hierarchy if the dominant fails
to punish challengers. Theoretically, this idea is distinct and runs counter to the deterring
effect USSR/Russia Security Subordination, as Global Power captures the idea of a global
competition for subordinates, while USSR/Russia Security Subordination accounts for So-
viet affinity within a dyad (and a subsequent deterring effect from an additional potential
entrant to an existing conflict). Global power is measured as CINC US∑
CINC Other Great Powers
.34 This
measure is included only in robustness checks.
34Within the time frame under review, great powers are operationalized as China (1950-2000), France
(1950-2000), Germany (1991-2000), Japan (1991-2000), Great Britain (1950-2000), the US (1950-2000), and
Russia/USSR (1950-2000) (Bennett and Stam 2000).
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Table D.1: Descriptive Statistics, US Hierarchy and Conflict.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Challenge 549570 0.001 0.034 0 1
Security Hierarchy 549570 0.234 0.393 0 5.913
Shared Alliances 549570 0.373 0.479 0 1
Military Personnel 549570 0.096 0.546 0 10.826
Economic Hierarchy 549570 0.200 0.311 0 2.781
Trade Dependence 549570 0.054 0.140 0 2.708
Exchange Rate 549570 0.213 0.359 0 1
Power Ratio (Challenge) 549570 0.515 0.356 0 1
Power Change 549570 0.001 0.081 -3.58 0.916
Previous Challenge (Challenge) 549570 0.026 0.322 0 21
Contiguity 549570 0.024 0.154 0 1
Joint Democracy (Challenge) 549570 0.209 0.406 0 1
Alliance 549570 0.041 0.199 0 1
Trade 549570 -6.638 0.602 -6.908 0.265
Civil War 549570 0.068 0.253 0 1
Punishment 652 0.259 0.439 0 1
Relative Security Hierarchy 652 0.046 0.310 -2.303 1.32
Relative Shared Alliances 652 0.087 0.483 -1 1
Relative Military Personnel 652 0.004 0.328 -4.605 1.641
Relative Economic Hierarchy 652 0.006 0.385 -1.258 1.742
Relative Trade Dependence 652 0.009 0.225 -1.678 2.323
Relative Exchange Rate 652 0.000 0.450 -1 1
USSR/Russia Security Hierarchy 652 0.084 0.276 0 1
Global Power 652 33.383 4.497 28.274 46.638
Power Ratio (punishment) 652 93.582 9.224 53.22 99.993
Distance 652 8.524 0.602 0 9.099
Joint Democracy (punishment) 652 0.275 0.447 0 1
Ongoing MID 652 3.307 1.244 1 6
Previous Challenge (punishment) 652 1.856 2.754 0 21
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